one great example is Sean Carroll. He was arguing for the finality of death, at the time saying that when we die we simply cease to exist, and brought Dr. Stephen Novella with him. Forgive Dr. Steve, he is a doctor, not a physicist, but Sean, it is opposite of what he said about his view of time (eternalism). Meaning that no moment in time comes into existence nor cease to exist, therefore nobody appears into existence when they are born nor disappear from reality, beyond memories and works and ideas they have left, when they die. If he simply said we don't experience anything new, or in the moments after last moment of life in order, that would be more consistent. That shows again many American atheists do have allergic reaction to religion that if the religion says one thing, they will say the opposite, probably due to allergic reaction to religious right. But as Sean is a reasonable guy and has no hostility to religion, seems to have allergic reaction to religion. (probably due to aversion to bigotry and lifestyle prescriptions of religious fundamentalists).
<many American atheists do have allergic reaction to religion that if the religion says one thing, they will say the opposite... (probably due to aversion to bigotry and lifestyle prescriptions of religious fundamentalists).>
Yes, exactly. But this is throwing the baby with the dirty water. Giving up (and forcing others to give up) hopeful imagination and a sense of enchantment is worse than religious fundamentalism.
<no moment in time comes into existence nor cease to exist, therefore nobody appears into existence when they are born nor disappear from reality>
Stay tuned for my next post on eternalism. If information is conserved (and Carroll thinks information is conserved in the multiverse), then the possibility to recover/reconstruct the past exists in principle. There's some serious unscrambling to do of course, but nothing that a really ultra-advanced civilization couldn't achieve, in principle.
I agree with about 90% of the podcast , I do have a few quibbles. You both say there is no precise definition of determinism but how about this; if the universe is deterministic and if you tell me how much error you are willing to tolerate in a prediction and as long as that allowable error is greater than zero then the laws of physics allow me to measure the present state of the universe with sufficient accuracy that I can figure out what things will be like in the future within that margin of error using only a finite number of computations.
Steinhart says atheists are being "Christian normative" and are really just saying they don't believe in Christianity or in any of the Abrahamic religions, perhaps some atheists are only saying that but not all and certainly not the atheist that is writing these words. I say the fundamental ideas behind Hinduism are nearly as ridiculous as Christianity, although I admit Buddhism has not caused as much grief as the other large religions have, I think that's because at least in its original form Buddhism didn't claim to have access to any profound ideas about the nature of reality, it was more of a personal philosophy on how to live a happy contented life. I also think the existence of God and the existence of life after death are two separate questions with no obvious connection between the two; you could have God without life after death and you could have life after death without God, or you could have neither or you could have both.
I was also a little disappointed there was no mention of cryonics.
<the laws of physics allow me to measure the present state of the universe with sufficient accuracy...>
This is, I think, an open issue. Chaos shows that even arbitrarily accurate knowledge of the present won't allow you to predict the future within the same margin of error for an arbitrarily long time. Also, most current interpretations of quantum physics hold that nature is not strictly deterministic.
<I also think the existence of God and the existence of life after death are two separate questions with no obvious connection between the two; you could have God without life after death and you could have life after death without God, or you could have neither or you could have both. >
I agree. In Eric's book there are sketches of theories of life after death without God. The sketches are taken from the much more detailed treatment in Eric's previous book "Your Digital Afterlives."
<I was also a little disappointed there was no mention of cryonics.>
Eric mentioned mindfiles and mind uploading (in the first part of his answer to my question about plausible scientific theories of life after death). To a computationalist like him, revival after cryonics and mind uploading are essentially the same thing. I have been credited for coining the term "cryionics for uploaders" to indicate brain (connectome) preservation for future mind uploading.
>> Chaos shows that even arbitrarily accurate knowledge of the present won't allow you to predict the future within the same margin of error for an arbitrarily long time.
If you ignore quantum mechanics and are just talking about Newtonian physics then even with chaos if you want me to predict a future state of a system with an error less than X (with X being greater than zero) then, if I know the present state of the system with an error less than Y (with Y also being greater than zero) then I could predict the future state of the system within the allowable error and do so by using only a finite number of computations. Of course it could take an astronomical number to an astronomical power of computations to make such a prediction so it wouldn't be practical but, although incredibly large, it would be finite and thus theoretically possible. But if you put quantum mechanics back in the picture then all bets are off and things become nondeterminative; yes if Everett is right then even with quantum mechanics things are deterministic from the Multiverse point of view, but since no observer has the Multiverse point of view and observers are the ones who are supposed to make the prediction that's irrelevant.
>> Eric mentioned mindfiles and mind uploading (in the first part of his
answer to my question about plausible scientific theories of life
after death). To a computationalist like him, revival after cryonics
and mind uploading are essentially the same thing.
I agree with Eric about that, that's why when I die I opted that only my brain will be frozen, I saw no reason that my left big toe needs to be preserved, it would be a waste of liquid nitrogen.
>> I have been credited for coining the term "cryionics for uploaders" to indicate
brain (connectome) preservation for future mind uploading.
I have always liked that phrase but until now I didn't know you were the author of it. The only problem I have with it is I wish I thought of it first!
< If you ignore quantum mechanics and are just talking about Newtonian physics then even with chaos if you want me to predict a future state of a system with an error less than X (with X being greater than zero) then, if I know the present state of the system with an error less than Y (with Y also being greater than zero) then I could predict the future state of the system within the allowable error and do so by using only a finite number of computations.>
This is not entirely correct. Sensitivity to initial conditions means that, if you know the present state of the system with an error less than Y, you can predict the future state of the system with an error less than X only until time T. After T, you need a smaller error Y to achieve the same accuracy X, and this is an exponential runaway.
< if Everett is right then even with quantum mechanics things are deterministic from the Multiverse point of view, but since no observer has the Multiverse point of view and observers are the ones who are supposed to make the prediction that's irrelevant.>
Practically irrelevant yes, but not philosophically irrelevant.
>> If you ignore quantum mechanics and are just talking about Newtonian physics then even with chaos if you want me to predict a future state of a system with an error less than X (with X being greater than zero) then, if I know the present state of the system with an error less than Y (with Y also being greater than zero) then I could predict the future state of the system within the allowable error and do so by using only a finite number of computations.>>
> This is not entirely correct. Sensitivity to initial conditions means that, if you know the present state of the system with an error less than Y, you can predict the future state of the system with an error less than X only until time T.>
Yes but that is not inconsistent with what I said. It would still be possible for me to predict the outcome deeper into the future after time T within the allowed error, I'd just have to know the present state of the universe with less error than before (although it would still be greater than zero) and I'd need to do even more computation (although it would still be finite).
> After T, you need a smaller error Y to achieve tgecsame accuracy X, and this is an exponential runaway.
Yes but as long as you ask me to predict a time that is not an infinite distance away then it could still theoretically be calculated. In saying that I'm ignoring the fact that it takes energy to perform a calculation and if I do that many calculations it would give off so much heat it would disturb the state of the universe; but that is getting into the quantum mechanical realm and I was just talking about Newtonian physics.
>> if Everett is right then even with quantum mechanics things are deterministic from the Multiverse point of view, but since no observer has the Multiverse point of view and observers are the ones who are supposed to make the prediction that's irrelevant.
> Practically irrelevant yes, but not philosophically irrelevant.
If quantum mechanics is valid, and all the evidence is that it is, and if nothing has a Multiverse point of view, then even a philosopher would have to admit that no observer can make predictions with 100% accuracy, not even theoretically.
<Yes but as long as you ask me to predict a time that is not an infinite distance away then it could still theoretically be calculated...>
Given unlimited computational resources, yes. But in the real world, sooner or later you'll run against limitations of storage and time.
<If quantum mechanics is valid, and all the evidence is that it is, and if nothing has a Multiverse point of view, then even a philosopher would have to admit that no observer can make predictions with 100% accuracy, not even theoretically.>
Yes. But you support Everett and I almost support Everett. According to Everett, the underlying reality of the multiverse as a whole is fully deterministic, even if individual worlds appear not to be.
Besides Everett, there is the possibility that future research could derive quantum mechanics from an underlying fully deterministic theory (as Einstein and Dirac thought, and now Wolfram).
one great example is Sean Carroll. He was arguing for the finality of death, at the time saying that when we die we simply cease to exist, and brought Dr. Stephen Novella with him. Forgive Dr. Steve, he is a doctor, not a physicist, but Sean, it is opposite of what he said about his view of time (eternalism). Meaning that no moment in time comes into existence nor cease to exist, therefore nobody appears into existence when they are born nor disappear from reality, beyond memories and works and ideas they have left, when they die. If he simply said we don't experience anything new, or in the moments after last moment of life in order, that would be more consistent. That shows again many American atheists do have allergic reaction to religion that if the religion says one thing, they will say the opposite, probably due to allergic reaction to religious right. But as Sean is a reasonable guy and has no hostility to religion, seems to have allergic reaction to religion. (probably due to aversion to bigotry and lifestyle prescriptions of religious fundamentalists).
<many American atheists do have allergic reaction to religion that if the religion says one thing, they will say the opposite... (probably due to aversion to bigotry and lifestyle prescriptions of religious fundamentalists).>
Yes, exactly. But this is throwing the baby with the dirty water. Giving up (and forcing others to give up) hopeful imagination and a sense of enchantment is worse than religious fundamentalism.
<no moment in time comes into existence nor cease to exist, therefore nobody appears into existence when they are born nor disappear from reality>
Stay tuned for my next post on eternalism. If information is conserved (and Carroll thinks information is conserved in the multiverse), then the possibility to recover/reconstruct the past exists in principle. There's some serious unscrambling to do of course, but nothing that a really ultra-advanced civilization couldn't achieve, in principle.
I agree with about 90% of the podcast , I do have a few quibbles. You both say there is no precise definition of determinism but how about this; if the universe is deterministic and if you tell me how much error you are willing to tolerate in a prediction and as long as that allowable error is greater than zero then the laws of physics allow me to measure the present state of the universe with sufficient accuracy that I can figure out what things will be like in the future within that margin of error using only a finite number of computations.
Steinhart says atheists are being "Christian normative" and are really just saying they don't believe in Christianity or in any of the Abrahamic religions, perhaps some atheists are only saying that but not all and certainly not the atheist that is writing these words. I say the fundamental ideas behind Hinduism are nearly as ridiculous as Christianity, although I admit Buddhism has not caused as much grief as the other large religions have, I think that's because at least in its original form Buddhism didn't claim to have access to any profound ideas about the nature of reality, it was more of a personal philosophy on how to live a happy contented life. I also think the existence of God and the existence of life after death are two separate questions with no obvious connection between the two; you could have God without life after death and you could have life after death without God, or you could have neither or you could have both.
I was also a little disappointed there was no mention of cryonics.
John K Clark
Thanks John for liking this episode.
<the laws of physics allow me to measure the present state of the universe with sufficient accuracy...>
This is, I think, an open issue. Chaos shows that even arbitrarily accurate knowledge of the present won't allow you to predict the future within the same margin of error for an arbitrarily long time. Also, most current interpretations of quantum physics hold that nature is not strictly deterministic.
<I also think the existence of God and the existence of life after death are two separate questions with no obvious connection between the two; you could have God without life after death and you could have life after death without God, or you could have neither or you could have both. >
I agree. In Eric's book there are sketches of theories of life after death without God. The sketches are taken from the much more detailed treatment in Eric's previous book "Your Digital Afterlives."
<I was also a little disappointed there was no mention of cryonics.>
Eric mentioned mindfiles and mind uploading (in the first part of his answer to my question about plausible scientific theories of life after death). To a computationalist like him, revival after cryonics and mind uploading are essentially the same thing. I have been credited for coining the term "cryionics for uploaders" to indicate brain (connectome) preservation for future mind uploading.
>> Chaos shows that even arbitrarily accurate knowledge of the present won't allow you to predict the future within the same margin of error for an arbitrarily long time.
If you ignore quantum mechanics and are just talking about Newtonian physics then even with chaos if you want me to predict a future state of a system with an error less than X (with X being greater than zero) then, if I know the present state of the system with an error less than Y (with Y also being greater than zero) then I could predict the future state of the system within the allowable error and do so by using only a finite number of computations. Of course it could take an astronomical number to an astronomical power of computations to make such a prediction so it wouldn't be practical but, although incredibly large, it would be finite and thus theoretically possible. But if you put quantum mechanics back in the picture then all bets are off and things become nondeterminative; yes if Everett is right then even with quantum mechanics things are deterministic from the Multiverse point of view, but since no observer has the Multiverse point of view and observers are the ones who are supposed to make the prediction that's irrelevant.
>> Eric mentioned mindfiles and mind uploading (in the first part of his
answer to my question about plausible scientific theories of life
after death). To a computationalist like him, revival after cryonics
and mind uploading are essentially the same thing.
I agree with Eric about that, that's why when I die I opted that only my brain will be frozen, I saw no reason that my left big toe needs to be preserved, it would be a waste of liquid nitrogen.
>> I have been credited for coining the term "cryionics for uploaders" to indicate
brain (connectome) preservation for future mind uploading.
I have always liked that phrase but until now I didn't know you were the author of it. The only problem I have with it is I wish I thought of it first!
John K Clark
John,
< If you ignore quantum mechanics and are just talking about Newtonian physics then even with chaos if you want me to predict a future state of a system with an error less than X (with X being greater than zero) then, if I know the present state of the system with an error less than Y (with Y also being greater than zero) then I could predict the future state of the system within the allowable error and do so by using only a finite number of computations.>
This is not entirely correct. Sensitivity to initial conditions means that, if you know the present state of the system with an error less than Y, you can predict the future state of the system with an error less than X only until time T. After T, you need a smaller error Y to achieve the same accuracy X, and this is an exponential runaway.
< if Everett is right then even with quantum mechanics things are deterministic from the Multiverse point of view, but since no observer has the Multiverse point of view and observers are the ones who are supposed to make the prediction that's irrelevant.>
Practically irrelevant yes, but not philosophically irrelevant.
John,
>> If you ignore quantum mechanics and are just talking about Newtonian physics then even with chaos if you want me to predict a future state of a system with an error less than X (with X being greater than zero) then, if I know the present state of the system with an error less than Y (with Y also being greater than zero) then I could predict the future state of the system within the allowable error and do so by using only a finite number of computations.>>
> This is not entirely correct. Sensitivity to initial conditions means that, if you know the present state of the system with an error less than Y, you can predict the future state of the system with an error less than X only until time T.>
Yes but that is not inconsistent with what I said. It would still be possible for me to predict the outcome deeper into the future after time T within the allowed error, I'd just have to know the present state of the universe with less error than before (although it would still be greater than zero) and I'd need to do even more computation (although it would still be finite).
> After T, you need a smaller error Y to achieve tgecsame accuracy X, and this is an exponential runaway.
Yes but as long as you ask me to predict a time that is not an infinite distance away then it could still theoretically be calculated. In saying that I'm ignoring the fact that it takes energy to perform a calculation and if I do that many calculations it would give off so much heat it would disturb the state of the universe; but that is getting into the quantum mechanical realm and I was just talking about Newtonian physics.
>> if Everett is right then even with quantum mechanics things are deterministic from the Multiverse point of view, but since no observer has the Multiverse point of view and observers are the ones who are supposed to make the prediction that's irrelevant.
> Practically irrelevant yes, but not philosophically irrelevant.
If quantum mechanics is valid, and all the evidence is that it is, and if nothing has a Multiverse point of view, then even a philosopher would have to admit that no observer can make predictions with 100% accuracy, not even theoretically.
John K Clark
<Yes but as long as you ask me to predict a time that is not an infinite distance away then it could still theoretically be calculated...>
Given unlimited computational resources, yes. But in the real world, sooner or later you'll run against limitations of storage and time.
<If quantum mechanics is valid, and all the evidence is that it is, and if nothing has a Multiverse point of view, then even a philosopher would have to admit that no observer can make predictions with 100% accuracy, not even theoretically.>
Yes. But you support Everett and I almost support Everett. According to Everett, the underlying reality of the multiverse as a whole is fully deterministic, even if individual worlds appear not to be.
Besides Everett, there is the possibility that future research could derive quantum mechanics from an underlying fully deterministic theory (as Einstein and Dirac thought, and now Wolfram).